rr3-apk/NETWORK-SECURITY-ANALYSIS.md

RR3 Network Security Analysis

Analysis Date: February 23, 2026
APK Version: Real Racing 3 v14.0.1
Security Auditor: Community Server Project

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🔒 Executive Summary

Overall Security Rating: 🔴 HIGH RISK - Production Not Recommended

The RR3 APK's network implementation uses HTTPS/TLS for encryption but disables all certificate validation, making it vulnerable to Man-in-the-Middle (MITM) attacks. This was likely an intentional design choice by EA/Firemonkeys to support:

• Development/testing environments
• Custom server configurations
• Self-signed certificates

For Community Servers: This is actually beneficial since it allows:

• ✅ Self-signed SSL certificates (no need for paid certificates)
• ✅ Let's Encrypt certificates without pinning
• ✅ Custom domain names without hostname verification
• ✅ Easy local testing (localhost, 10.0.2.2, etc.)

Trade-off: Users are vulnerable to MITM attacks if using untrusted networks.

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🔍 Detailed Security Analysis

1. Encryption Status

✅ Transport Layer Encryption: ENABLED

Protocol: TLS/SSL over HTTPS
Implementation: Native Java HttpsURLConnection and SSLContext

# From HttpRequest.smali (CloudCell API)
invoke-static {v3}, Ljavax/net/ssl/SSLContext;->getInstance(Ljava/lang/String;)
# Uses "TLS" protocol

What This Means:

• All network traffic is encrypted in transit
• Data cannot be read by passive network observers
• Eavesdropping on open WiFi networks requires active MITM attack

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2. Certificate Validation: DISABLED ⚠️

🔴 Critical Vulnerability #1: Custom TrustManager Bypasses Validation

File: com/firemonkeys/cloudcellapi/CloudcellTrustManager.java

Code Analysis:

public class CloudcellTrustManager implements X509TrustManager {
    private boolean m_bSSLCheck = false;  // Default: DISABLED
    
    @Override
    public void checkServerTrusted(X509Certificate[] chain, String authType) {
        // Only checks if m_bSSLCheck is true
        if (this.m_bSSLCheck) {
            // Validates certificate chain
            // Checks expiration dates
            // Checks CA signing
        } else {
            // DOES NOTHING - accepts all certificates!
        }
    }
}

Default Behavior: SSL validation is OFF by default (m_bSSLCheck = false)

Impact:

• Accepts expired certificates
• Accepts self-signed certificates
• Accepts certificates from untrusted CAs
• Accepts certificates for wrong domains

---

🔴 Critical Vulnerability #2: Empty TrustManager in Http.java

File: com/firemint/realracing/Http.java

Code Analysis:

# Http$1.smali (Anonymous TrustManager class)
.method public checkServerTrusted([Ljava/security/cert/X509Certificate;Ljava/lang/String;)V
    .locals 0
    return-void  # DOES NOTHING!
.end method

Behavior: The checkServerTrusted() method is completely empty - returns immediately without any validation.

Impact:

• Zero certificate validation
• Accepts ANY certificate
• No expiration checks
• No CA chain validation

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3. Hostname Verification: DISABLED ⚠️

🔴 Critical Vulnerability #3: ALLOW_ALL_HOSTNAME_VERIFIER

Files:

• com/firemonkeys/cloudcellapi/HttpRequest.java (line 111)
• com/firemint/realracing/Http.java (line 180)

Code:

HttpsURLConnection.setDefaultHostnameVerifier(
    SSLSocketFactory.ALLOW_ALL_HOSTNAME_VERIFIER
);

What This Does:

• Disables hostname verification entirely
• Accepts certificates for ANY domain
• Example: Certificate for attacker.com accepted when connecting to rr3.example.com

Attack Scenario:

1. Attacker creates certificate for evil.com
2. DNS hijacked to point rr3.example.com → attacker's server
3. Game accepts evil.com certificate for rr3.example.com connection
4. Attacker can intercept all traffic

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4. Certificate Pinning: NOT IMPLEMENTED

Status: ❌ No certificate pinning found

OkHttp CertificatePinner Detected:

# Found in dependencies
Lokhttp3/CertificatePinner;

But: No pin hashes configured, so pinning is not active.

What This Means:

• No hardcoded certificate fingerprints
• Game doesn't validate specific server certificates
• Any valid-looking certificate accepted

For Community Servers: This is GOOD - allows any SSL certificate!

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🚨 Vulnerability Summary

#	Vulnerability	Severity	CVSS	Exploitable?
1	Disabled Certificate Validation	🔴 CRITICAL	8.1	✅ YES
2	Empty TrustManager (Http.java)	🔴 CRITICAL	8.1	✅ YES
3	ALLOW_ALL_HOSTNAME_VERIFIER	🔴 CRITICAL	7.4	✅ YES
4	No Certificate Pinning	🟡 MEDIUM	5.3	⚠️ Conditional
5	Configurable SSL Flag (default OFF)	🟡 MEDIUM	5.9	⚠️ Conditional

Combined CVSS Score: 8.1/10 (High Severity)

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🎯 Attack Vectors

Attack Vector #1: MITM on Public WiFi

Scenario:

1. User connects to compromised WiFi (coffee shop, airport)
2. Attacker performs ARP spoofing or DNS hijacking
3. Attacker redirects game traffic to malicious server
4. Attacker presents self-signed certificate
5. Game accepts certificate without validation
6. Attacker intercepts all game data

Data at Risk:

• Synergy ID (user identifier)
• Progress/save data
• In-game currency balances
• Career progression
• Server communications

Likelihood: 🟡 MEDIUM (requires active attack)
Impact: 🔴 HIGH (full data interception)

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Attack Vector #2: DNS Hijacking

Scenario:

1. Attacker compromises user's DNS (router hack, malicious DNS server)
2. User inputs server URL: https://rr3.example.com
3. DNS resolves to attacker's IP instead
4. Attacker presents fake certificate
5. Game accepts it due to disabled validation
6. User unknowingly connects to malicious server

Data at Risk:

• User credentials (if implemented)
• Progress data sent to attacker
• Malicious game modifications

Likelihood: 🟢 LOW (requires DNS compromise)
Impact: 🔴 HIGH (complete server impersonation)

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Attack Vector #3: Local Network Interception

Scenario:

1. User on compromised local network (infected router, corporate MITM)
2. Attacker performs transparent proxy
3. Attacker replaces SSL certificates
4. Game accepts replacement certificates
5. All traffic flows through attacker

Data at Risk:

• All network communications
• Real-time gameplay data
• Server responses

Likelihood: 🟢 LOW (requires network access)
Impact: 🔴 HIGH (complete visibility)

---

🛡️ Security Recommendations

For Community Server Operators

✅ Option 1: Use Let's Encrypt (Recommended)

Pros:

• Free, automated certificates
• Valid CA signatures
• Works with ANY SSL validator
• Easy renewal (90-day cycle)

Setup:

# Using Certbot
certbot certonly --standalone -d rr3.example.com

# Auto-renewal
certbot renew --dry-run

Result: Even though validation is disabled in APK, you have a proper certificate for users with patched/secure clients.

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✅ Option 2: Self-Signed Certificate

Pros:

• Free
• Complete control
• Works due to disabled validation

Cons:

• Not trusted by browsers
• Won't work with fixed APK

Generation:

# Generate self-signed cert
openssl req -x509 -newkey rsa:4096 -keyout key.pem -out cert.pem -days 365 -nodes

# For ASP.NET Core
dotnet dev-certs https --export-path cert.pfx --password YourPassword

Result: Works perfectly with current APK since validation is disabled.

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✅ Option 3: HTTP Only (Development)

Pros:

• Simplest setup
• No certificate management
• Fast testing

Cons:

• ⚠️ NO ENCRYPTION - traffic visible on network
• Not recommended for production

When to Use:

• Local testing only
• Isolated networks
• Development environments

---

For Security-Conscious Users

🔒 Option 1: Fix the APK (Advanced)

Changes Needed:

1. Enable SSL Validation in CloudcellTrustManager:

# In CloudcellTrustManager.smali
# Change: m_bSSLCheck = false
# To:     m_bSSLCheck = true

.field private m_bSSLCheck:Z

.method public constructor <init>(...)
    # ...
    const/4 v0, 0x1  # Change 0x0 to 0x1 (true)
    iput-boolean v0, p0, Lcom/firemonkeys/cloudcellapi/CloudcellTrustManager;->m_bSSLCheck:Z

2. Implement Proper TrustManager in Http.java:

# Replace Http$1.smali checkServerTrusted with:
.method public checkServerTrusted([Ljava/security/cert/X509Certificate;Ljava/lang/String;)V
    .locals 2
    
    # Get default TrustManagerFactory
    invoke-static {}, Ljavax/net/ssl/TrustManagerFactory;->getDefaultAlgorithm()Ljava/lang/String;
    move-result-object v0
    invoke-static {v0}, Ljavax/net/ssl/TrustManagerFactory;->getInstance(Ljava/lang/String;)
    
    # Delegate to system trust manager
    invoke-virtual {v0, p1, p2}, Ljavax/net/ssl/X509TrustManager;->checkServerTrusted(...)
    return-void
.end method

3. Use Proper HostnameVerifier:

# In HttpRequest.smali and Http.smali
# Change: SSLSocketFactory.ALLOW_ALL_HOSTNAME_VERIFIER
# To:     HttpsURLConnection.getDefaultHostnameVerifier()

invoke-static {}, Ljavax/net/ssl/HttpsURLConnection;->getDefaultHostnameVerifier()
move-result-object v0
invoke-static {v0}, Ljavax/net/ssl/HttpsURLConnection;->setDefaultHostnameVerifier(...)

Result: APK will only accept properly signed certificates from trusted CAs.

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🔒 Option 2: Use VPN

Recommendation:

• Connect through trusted VPN when using community servers
• Prevents local network MITM attacks
• Encrypts all traffic to VPN endpoint

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🔒 Option 3: Trusted Networks Only

Best Practice:

• Only use community servers on home/trusted networks
• Avoid public WiFi when playing
• Be cautious of unknown networks

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📊 Comparison: Current vs. Secure Implementation

Feature	Current APK	Secure APK	Impact
TLS/SSL Encryption	✅ Enabled	✅ Enabled	No change
Certificate Validation	❌ Disabled	✅ Enabled	Rejects invalid certs
Hostname Verification	❌ Disabled	✅ Enabled	Rejects domain mismatches
Self-Signed Certs	✅ Accepted	❌ Rejected	Requires valid CA
Expired Certs	✅ Accepted	❌ Rejected	Must be current
Let's Encrypt	✅ Works	✅ Works	Compatible
MITM Attacks	🔴 Vulnerable	✅ Protected	Security improved

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🎮 For Community Server Users: What You Need to Know

✅ Is My Data Encrypted?

YES - Data is encrypted using TLS/SSL during transmission. Network eavesdroppers cannot read your traffic without an active MITM attack.

⚠️ Am I Safe from MITM Attacks?

NO - The game accepts any SSL certificate, including fake ones. If an attacker intercepts your connection, they can read all game data.

Risk Level by Network:

• 🟢 Home WiFi (Secure): LOW risk - attacker needs access to your router
• 🟡 Public WiFi (Coffee Shop): MEDIUM risk - easier to attack
• 🟡 Corporate Network: MEDIUM risk - IT admins can intercept
• 🟡 Hotel WiFi: MEDIUM risk - shared infrastructure

🛡️ How to Protect Myself?

1. Use Trusted Networks: Play on home WiFi only
2. Use VPN: Encrypts traffic before it reaches network
3. Trust Server Operator: Choose reputable community servers
4. Check Certificate: Use browser to verify server's SSL certificate
5. Wait for Secure APK: Community may release hardened version

📱 Should I Be Worried?

For Most Users: NO

Why:

• Game data isn't sensitive (no passwords, credit cards, etc.)
• Synergy ID is just a game identifier
• Progress data is game-related only
• EA has already shut down official servers (no real-money IAP)

When to Worry:

• Using public/untrusted WiFi frequently
• Server operators are unknown
• Suspicious network activity

Overall Assessment: Low real-world risk for a discontinued mobile game with community servers.

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🔬 Technical Deep Dive

SSL/TLS Implementation Details

TLS Version Support

# From HttpRequest.smali
const-string v3, "TLS"
invoke-static {v3}, Ljavax/net/ssl/SSLContext;->getInstance(Ljava/lang/String;)

Supported Versions:

• TLS 1.0 ✅
• TLS 1.1 ✅
• TLS 1.2 ✅
• TLS 1.3 ✅ (Android 10+)

Note: "TLS" protocol string enables highest version supported by Android OS.

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Cipher Suites

Default: Uses Android system default cipher suites (not customized)

Typical Suites (Android 8+):

• TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256
• TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256
• TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384
• TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384

Security: Strong cipher suites with forward secrecy (ECDHE) and AEAD encryption (GCM).

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TrustManager Chain

// Custom trust manager bypasses default validation
TrustManager[] trustManagers = new TrustManager[]{
    new CloudcellTrustManager(this)  // Custom, validation disabled
};

SSLContext sslContext = SSLContext.getInstance("TLS");
sslContext.init(null, trustManagers, new SecureRandom());

HttpsURLConnection.setDefaultSSLSocketFactory(
    new TLSSocketFactory(sslContext.getSocketFactory())
);

Flow:

1. TLS handshake initiated
2. Server presents certificate
3. CloudcellTrustManager.checkServerTrusted() called
4. Method checks m_bSSLCheck flag → false
5. Returns immediately without validation
6. Connection accepted

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Code Locations Reference

Security Component	File Path	Lines
CloudcellTrustManager	smali_classes2/com/firemonkeys/cloudcellapi/CloudcellTrustManager.smali	56-76
Empty TrustManager	smali_classes2/com/firemint/realracing/Http$1.smali	38-42
ALLOW_ALL_HOSTNAME_VERIFIER	smali_classes2/com/firemonkeys/cloudcellapi/HttpRequest.smali	111
ALLOW_ALL_HOSTNAME_VERIFIER	smali_classes2/com/firemint/realracing/Http.smali	179-181
SSL Flag (m_bSSLCheck)	smali_classes2/com/firemonkeys/cloudcellapi/CloudcellTrustManager.smali	24

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📝 Summary & Conclusion

✅ What's Good

1. TLS/SSL encryption is enabled - Data is encrypted in transit
2. Strong cipher suites - Modern encryption algorithms used
3. No certificate pinning - Allows community servers flexibility
4. Accepts self-signed certificates - Easy local testing

❌ What's Bad

1. Certificate validation disabled - Accepts invalid/expired certificates
2. Hostname verification disabled - Accepts certificates for wrong domains
3. Empty TrustManager - Zero validation in Http.java implementation
4. MITM vulnerability - Attackers can intercept traffic on compromised networks

🎯 Bottom Line

For Community Server Project: This is actually beneficial - you can use self-signed certificates or Let's Encrypt without any issues. The disabled validation means:

• ✅ Easy setup with any SSL certificate
• ✅ Works with localhost, 10.0.2.2, custom domains
• ✅ No need for expensive certificates
• ✅ Quick development/testing

For Security: Yes, there are vulnerabilities, but the real-world risk is low for a discontinued mobile game. Users aren't transmitting sensitive data (passwords, credit cards), just game progress.

Recommendation:

• Use Let's Encrypt for production servers (free, proper certificates)
• Document the security tradeoffs for users
• Consider releasing a "hardened" APK variant for security-conscious users
• Add SSL certificate verification toggle in settings (let users choose)

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Analysis Complete: February 23, 2026
Next Steps: Implement server-side HTTPS with Let's Encrypt
Security Status: Known vulnerabilities documented, mitigation strategies provided